-derived SFLASH family of schemes, which uses monomials in a large field for the central portion, previously usually acknowledged as fastest. We show a small flaw in TTS/2 and present an improved TTS implementation which we call TTS/4. We will examine in some detail how well TTS/4 performs, how it stands up to previously known attacks, and why it represents an advance over TTS/2. Based on this topical assessment, we consider TTS in general and TTS/4 in particular to be competitive or superior in several aspects to other schemes, partly because the theoretical roots of TTS induce many good traits. One specific area in which TTS/4 should excel is in low-cost smartcards. It seems that the genre has great potential for practical deployment and deserves further attention by the cryptological community.
Introduction
Trapdoor mappings are central to Public-Key Cryptography. As such, cryptographers have studied trapdoor permutations and maps since the dawn of public key cryptography ( [13] ). A handful of the many schemes attempted reached practical deployment. However, the critical trapdoor maps are often very slow, and that is frequently due to the sheer size of the algebraic structure. Typical are the modular exponentiation in RSA or the discrete logarithms in ElGamal/DSA/ECC.
Multivariate public-key cryptosystems were born partly to circumvent this limitation. Great names like Shamir ([36] ) and Diffie ([17] ) abound among the pioneers, but the first scheme to show promise and grab everyone's attention was© by Imai and Matsumoto ([24, 30] ). Unfortunately a few years later¨© was broken by Patarin ([37] ) who in turn introduced many of his own innovations, some (HFE/¨© families) of which are still extant. The variations on this theme seem endless.
TTS (Tame Transformation Signatures) digital signature schemes belong to this extended family. We propose TTS/4, an improvement variant of TTS and discuss some design, performance, and security issues associated with the TTS genre. Multivariates mainly differ in their central maps, or kernels, that determine the trapdoors and hence their security. We aim to show that the Tame Transformation, a biregular map 3 first introduced by T. Moh to cryptography, is a viable kernel for trapdoor permutations with appreciable gains versus other schemes, and one that warrants further investigation. Sec. 2 is a succinct summary of TTS with theory and example. Like other multivariate schemes, TTS can be flexible in terms of hash length and is easily adaptable to ¢ ¡ ¤ £ -bit or longer hashes if needed, but TTS/4 is designed to work with current ¥ £ ¢ ¦ -bit hashes like SHA-1. We will quantify how well TTS/4 does by various metrics of speed and key size in Sec. 3. It compares well with some better-known alternatives. We see that TTS/4 is especially fast in signing and should be very suitable for use on a smartcard as seen in a point-by-point comparison with the SFLASH § ¡ scheme recommended by the NESSIE (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption) project for the same purpose ( [1, 35] ).
Avoiding the pitfalls that ensnared other schemes should be central to design decisions taken in present and future schemes, hence the multiplitude of techniques of Sec. 4 serves as an illustrative backdrop to TTS/4. We show that the TTS family can be made safe against current attacks.
Tame Transformation and TTS
While clock speeds went up according to Moore's law, unfortunately so did the complexity skyrocket and key lengths exponentiate. In a quarter-century, no alternative to the venerable RSA ever showed enough of a speed gain to become the heir apparent. Indeed, multivariate public-key cryptography arose out of this need for faster algorithms.
Cryptographers also applied their considerable talents to seeking faster alternatives in birational permutations ( [17, 43] ) over two decades. Birational implies being polynomial or rational, with a polynomial or rational inverse. Regrettably, an explicit lowdegree inverse that brings swiftness in execution sometimes has the undesirable side effect of engendering vulnerabilities ( [7, 8, 17] 
3 a bijective map that is polynomial both ways. In this paper we loosely call a map tame-like or just tame when it is either a tame transformation, or if it retains, at least where it matters, the property of having at least one preimage with easy serial computation through substitution or the solution of only linear equations but not an explicit inverse of low degree. So a tame-like map can be neither injective nor surjective.
In general the verification map of any TTS scheme is
For security reasons, the tame-like maps used in current TTS deviate slightly from the form above, while retaining the basic propertes of being flexible in hash sizes (because and ! can be adjusted easily) and being serially and quickly solvable in each @ ¥ . Note that the polynomials ¦ ¥ can contain many arbitrary parameters which will be randomly chosen and incorporated into the private keys.
The Old: TTS/2, a Previously Proposed Variant
Hereafter we fix¨! © . The signing map is
respectively, and (
¡ is given below: This variant was proposed in [6] . We shall propose some changes and explain why. 5 usually by LU decomposition, even though it does not yield all nonsingular matrices.
The New: TTS/4, an Efficient and More Secure TTS
We use the new (
given by: ¥ is different from the initial proposed form (TTS/2 of the previous section) in [6] . The indices in a quadratic term differ by 2, 3, 4, or 7 instead of 1, 3, 5, or 7. Principally, this is to avoid a separation of the @ into even and odd indexed parts (see Sec. 4.5). 5. The last four equations has its corresponding @ ¢ in a quadratic term. However, the entire collection of relations is still a tame-like map. The reason is
, and @ are random numbers independent of the message digest, we pick them so that ¥ $ 
H ¡ . 6 A good way to visualize the theme is to think of
as variable constants and
as variable coefficient of 3
, that is made part of the signature.
Raison d'etre: Avoiding a Common Kernel
In [7, 8] Coppersmith et al exploited a sequence of decreasing kernels in one of Shamir's Birational Permutation schemes, which meant that kernels of all quadratics in the public key must share a common intersection (see Sec. 4.4). The TTS/2 of [6] has a mild vulnerability of a similar type.
Proposition 1. The kernels of all twenty quadratic polynomials of a TTS/2 public key intersect in a one-dimensional subspace which will yield
will be the kernel of the quadratic part of 9 ¥ written in .
& 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 '
07 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 1
We will take ¥ 's, we know that
, which does not appear in any quadratic term of the TTS/2 kernel. But we also know the quadratic portion of ! span One may argue that one column does not completely shatter TTS/2, and indeed it does not seem to be so easy to eliminate any other variable, but we should still avoid such a problem if possible. For other design rationales in TTS/4, please see Secs. 4.2 and 4.5.
Performance Evaluation
These days one usually turns to a better compiler, a better computer, or special-purpose hardware like Motorola's AltiVec (see [29] ) for more performance. However, a better algorithm never hurts. We tabulate in Table 1 the better of timings from the vendorsubmitted and NESSIE's own binaries for all 5 second round NESSIE digital signature candidates 7 , normalized to a Pentium III at 500MHz from 9 is a lot faster than the more traditional contenders. Here, we have the modular exponentiation in RSA, a well-understood problem painstakingly optimized by over a quarter-century of computer science. Yet SFLASH § ¡ is faster and TTS/4 even more pronouncedly so. Clearly, there are intrinsic advantages to multivariate PKC. Due to concerns of security (see [34] ), NESSIE recommends RSA-1536 with higher exponents as opposed to RSA-1024 and ! ' , which surely would further cut down the speed by at least 50% or more without special hardware. This decision can be considered at least somewhat vindicated with news of recent advances (e.g. [44] ) on factoring large numbers.
-While TTS/4 (and in general TTS) does very well speedwise, unfortunately (although predictably) it is not the best in every category. All variants of TTS suffer from that common bugbear of multivariate cryptography: large keys. ECDSA is the undisputed king in small key sizes, although it uses discrete logarithms and is also slower than the multivariates. Thankfully, now smart cards can have on-card storage upward of ' kB. The TTS public keys, while not so trim, is smaller than that of its more robust French cousins and tolerable at 8.6kB. It was mentioned by the authors of SFLASH ( [42] ) that another choice is to have the private key on card and be able to spit out the public key when needed; the same holds true for TTS/4. Using this technique, we are able to fit 
A note about future extensibility. Eventually the world will move to ¡ ¤ £ -bit hashes, and a rough estimate is that an analog to TTS/4 will use about 2.5 times as many CPU cycles; in contrast, a RSA-based scheme gets to use longer hashes for free; ECDSA will be hurt grievously when forced up to a longer hash; SFLASH will probably scale slightly worse than a TTS-based scheme. All told, we expect TTS type schemes to be speedcompetitive 1-2 generations of hashes down the road. We experimented with various constructions which showed that we can make security scale as needed (Sec. 4.2).
Cryptanalysis
Solving generic quadratic equation systems is NP-hard ( [18] ), so barring an inherent flaw in TTS, there should be no sub-exponential time algorithms. But we should still take note of essentially brute-force solutions because some practical-sized systems may be solved that way, and in reasonable time. Other ideas, some ingenious, are used to cryptanalyze other multivariate schemes. We examine all ideas known to us but each seems to fail against TTS/4 without substantial modification.
First we deal with the more general approaches, designed to be applicable against all multivariate signature schemes, and describe in order the state of the art methods of both brute force searches (Sec. 4.1) and the more circumspect techniques of linearization (Sec. 4.2) and Gröbner bases (Sec. 4.3), and how each functions against TTS/4. Then we complements the above content by discussing attacks applicable to particular multivariate signature schemes.
Search Methods
The most advanced search methods against multivariate quadratic signature schemes ( [9] ) known to us so far were presented at PKC 2002. We summarize and test each given method in [9] against the current TTS/4. In each method, the aim is to solve 
Linearization-Type Attacks: XL and FXL

Kipnis and Shamir first introduced ([27]
) relinearization, refining the linearization techniques usually used to solve systems of high-order polynomial equations by using relationships between monomials. The simplest variant, "degree-4 relinearization", is based on the simple fact thatagainst HFE. There are more complex higher-degree improvements, but the relinearization technique can be considered superseded by XL below (Sec. 4.2), because XL (or FXL) is expected to work in whenever relinearization does ( [11] ; repeat if any independent variable remains. The FXL variant takes every possible guess at a number of variables then uses XL on the remainder. Normally, we want the number of equations to be at least one and usually 2 more than the number of variables. Another XL derivative, XL', reduce down to a system of equations in more than one variable. A recent report has it XL' can break FLASH § ¡ ( [10] ). Simulations supposedly show XL/FXL as effective on randomly selected quadratics -which also points to its undoing, as we shall see below. variables, and a randomly guessed assignment or restrictions on such a variable would most likely leading to a contradiction. Part of Heisuke Hironaka's Fields Medal work was an algorithm to determine the essential variables thereof ( [23] ) over characteristic zero fields. Unfortunately we are working with characteristic two fields, so Hironaka's methods (using many partial derivatives) fail in this case. Absent an oracle, the attacker now must guess which variables to fix, adding considerably to the running time.
Hilbert-Serre Theory, Solution Sets at Infinity and Why XL/FXL Fails
Assuming that 8 variables are guessed correctly. Now
. In fact the XL/FXL attacker would need to add 32 extraneous equations and 28 more variables.
[ ) complexity (times ¡ , the amount of effort to evaluate one set of polynomials). In practice it should be a lot more.
Giving the best of all worlds to the attacker, he guess again at 4 correct variables, and succeeds in reducing 
Gröbner Bases
Gröbner Bases is a well-known way of solving polynomial equations. The classic algorithm for computing Gröbner bases, Buchberger's algorithm, involves ordering all monomials (usually lexicographically) and take some appropriate algebraic combinations of the equations to eliminate the top monomial serially, until only one variable remains and then solve for that variable (a la Berlekamp). This method has been extended into more powerful variants by J. [2] ) for large fields and practical dimensions, Gröbner Bases are currently unlikely to be effective as an attack. Therefore, for large base fields such as © ¤ , current Gröbner-based methods cannot be used to cryptanalyze well-designed multivariate schemes, e.g., the current TTS variants, effectively.
The Coppersmith Attack vs Shamir's Birational Permutations Schemes
Shamir proposed a family of birational permutation signature schemes in [43] , but soon afterwards Coppersmith et al found a successful attack ( [7] ). One specific case 10 attacked by Coppersmith et al, "sequentially linearized birational permutations", has 9 ! @ , and 9 . We will have found a set of quadratic forms that are essentially equal to the original ones and enables us to forge signatures.
One can only admire the ingenuity of Coppersmith, Stern, and Vaudenay in looking for common kernel spaces. Theobald took pains to issue a similar warning ( [45] ) that "varying ranks of quadratic forms" may cause security concerns. Thankfully a TTS designer can arrange for a kernel without an onion-like sequence of decreasing kernels. Still, we consider TTS/4 to be partly inspired by their work.
Separation of Oil and Vinegar
In a simplified illustrative example of Patarin's Oil and Vinegar signature scheme, the private key is an invertible matrix "Unbalanced" Oil and Vinegar ( [25] ) aims to patch this by using more vinegar variables, but must tread a fine line: Too few vinegar variables, and there is still a successful reduction; too many, and brute force attacks of [9] (see Sec. 4.1) works. No such concerns exist in TTS/4. In TTS/2 we can see a separation of the variables into even and odd portions, and in TTS/4 we can also apportion the variables into
. But there are fundamental differences to [25, 26] :
1. In TTS, the vinegar (freely assigned) variables are @ )
, . . . , @
. Suppose an attacker finds the common eigenspaces for the TTS/2. Where in OV or UOV he would have decomposed the signature space into dependent "Oil" and independent "Vinegar" components, here he finds himself with two identical and mutually codependent Creamy Italian portions of 4 vinegar to 10 oil (the @ with even and odd indices respectively). The same successful determination for TTS/4 will result in dependent Vinaigrette (@ ) ,. . . ,
portions, neither of which seems particularly useful to him. 2. According to the analysis in [25] , with more dependent "oil" variables than independent "vinegar" variables the attack of [26] carries over without modification 11 , but not with more vinegar than oil. The latter is the case for TTS/4 with more variables in Ranch than in Vinaigrette.
Other Special Attacks
This includes MinRank, attacks on 2R and SFLASH, and IP-based attacks:
The MinRank attack: The MinRank attack ( [22] ) is a type of "intelligent brute-force approach". Unfortunately the authors' presentation contained some errors ( [33] ), so while the idea may be valuable it would not function against TTS/4 without extensive revision. As stated in ( [6] ), TTS/2 was written so that every 9 has the same high rank of 8 11 We find that hard to put into practice since the ¢ ¡ 's taken as square matrices are not invertible.
attack. The original SFLASH scheme used a subfield of © for all coefficients in its private and public keys. Gilbert and Minier observed ( [21] ) this to be a vulnerability and attacked the original SFLASH successfully, but their attack affects neither the current SFLASH § ¡ nor TTS/4. Geiselmann et al observed ( [19, 20] ) that the middle portion of any FLASH variant is homogeneous of degree two, and showed that to be a vulnerability. Their attack gives constant parts of both affine mappings cheaply. However, it does not entirely break SFLASH and is inapplicable to a Tame Transformation type method like TTS/4 since the tame portion has linear terms. Attacks against 2R schemes: The recent "2-round schemes" proposed by Patarin drew lots of fire ( [3, 46, 47] ), but the general structure of 2R schemes were so different from TTS that it is improbable for any of the suggested attacks to function against TTS/4 without substantial modification. Patarin's IP approach: If all the parameters in the tame portion of TTS were to be fixed, then the security of TTS/4 will depend on the difficulty of the IP problem [38, 39] . But TTS/4 should not have to fear from an IP-based attack. The central portion of Tame Transformation based methods contain lots of parameters (in the private key). This approach therefore will be hard to patch to be working against any TTS variant.
Conclusions
Multivariate Public-Key Cryptography is clearly a burgeoning research area rich in surprises and new discovery. For example, we saw that trivial changes to the structure in the previous TTS formulations can make an attacker's life harder and the scheme more secure, and made adjustments accordingly. We do not doubt that there shall be further attacks against multivariate schemes, attacks against the TTS genre and even specific attacks tailored against TTS/4, but we are confident that the myriad variations possible in the structure of tame and tame-like maps means that TTS will adapt and survive in the wilderness as a family of secure and fast signature schemes. In summary:
The just-proposed TTS/4 seems efficacious and impervious to known attacks. Tame Transformations, literally the centerpiece of TTS, seem to have many good properties required of a low-degree birational permutation without its drawbacks. A principal advantage is that the central quadratic portion of the scheme -a tame-like map -is easily mutable, variable with many parameters, nonhomogeneous, and very fast.
We feel justified in stating that the TTS family merits further attention.
